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Executive Summary 
This migration story of Brazilian-Japanese has always been an actively discussed issue that 
seems no single theory can explain. Out of the list of popular migration models, the push-pull 
theory is a classic migration tool that it is always tempting to apply. It has taken into account of 
various favourable (pull) factors for a place to attract immigrants and unfavourable (push) factors 
that force someone to leave.  
Yet, migration is a sophisticated process which involves the myriads of considerations that not only 
the economic prospect but also societal acceptance, personal aspiration etc. that no standalone 
factor can be capable of explaining why one person is willing to break the status quo and move 
from one country to another.  
By reducing each perspective, be it social, financial or others, as one of the “push-pull factors” 
implies that the model is assigning equal weighting to each factor or simply ignore it. Either of 
which suggests that the model is rather descriptive than predictive, thus undermining its validity in 
identifying the real driver behind the migrant’s decision. 
Therefore, this article is arguing that the push-pull model is too general and conclusive, attempting 
to generalize every migration case. In particular, we consider that the element of identity should be 
given an individual focus instead of being embedded in the rational calculation of cost and benefit 
since it is inevitably subject to personal affiliation. 
3 
Based on our findings on the interaction between Brazilian-Japanese and the Japanese 
government, we also make possible implications for Japan’s imminent ageing and labour shortage 
problem.  
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1. General phenomenon of migration of 
Japanese diaspora in Brazil 
1.1. Country’s needs 
Before discussing the migration pattern of Japanese diaspora in Brazil, we should identify the 
difference between immigration policy and immigrant policy. The former manages the control of the 
inflow and outflow policy while the latter talks about the situation and management of the 
immigrant population in the country. It also concerns about the immigrants’ social right and political 
participation.1 
From the country’s perspective, Japan primarily takes into consideration the value of immigrants 
when deciding both policies. The value of Brazilian-Japanese comes in two ways. It provides a 
cheap and solid pool of labour that can support the economic boom of Japan. This can be a 
solution to the labour shortage (especially in primary industries) that is happening in the country at 
that time.2 Another way in perceiving the value is the perception that the Brazilian-Japanese can 
preserve the country’s racial and social homogeneity. Not surprisingly, the Japanese pride 
originates from their understanding of that the country is comprised of one single ethnicity.3 This 
creates a stronger reason for the Japanese government to prefer admitting Brazilian-Japanese 
                                            
1 Jacquemin, A. “European Economic Integration: Limits and Prospects.” Routledge, 2002. 
2 Adachi, Nobuko. “Japanese and Nikkei at Home and Abroad: Negotiating Identities in a Global 
World.” Cambria Press (2010), 132. 
3 Arudou, D. “Embedded Racism: Japan's Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination.” Lexington 
Books (2015), 138-139. 
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over other overseas workforce. The Japanese government believed that the Brazilian-Japanese 
would adapt to the local Japanese culture in the original better and easier, regardless of their 
Brazilian nationality. 
1.2. Immigrants’ needs 
Among scholars, they mostly call the Brazilian-Japanese “dekassegui”. This term refers to Brazilian 
nationals whose ancestors and families came from Japan and are now staying in Japan to earn a 
living. So, why do they “move back” to Japan, i.e. return migration? We can understand this by 
breaking down their needs and studying their thinking on such needs 
1.2.1. Economic concerns 
Immigrants are mostly concerned about the stability and prospect of the place they migrate to and 
stay. What made Brazilian-Japanese leave for their ancestral homeland would mainly do with a 
declining economic situation in Brazil.4 Apart from the economic concerns to make the decision of 
leaving, the same also applies to the immigrants deciding the next destination to move on. The 
Japanese economic boom in the 1980s and early 1990s made the country a world famous spot. 
Therefore, return migration is certainly not a difficult decision for the Brazilian-Japanese. 
It is worth noting that most Brazilian-Japanese moved to Japan for the sake of better income and 
more opportunities that would eventually improve their (family) life in Brazil. They generally saw 
Brazil as their homeland that they would eventually return.5 The high income that they earn would 
                                            
4  Ember, M., and Skoggard, I. “Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures 
Around the World.” Springer (2005), 602. 
5 Alicea, M. “Migration and Immigration: A Global View.” Greenwood (2004), 32-35. 
9 
provide them an option to have nicer housing, better education for their offsprings, own business, 
etc. All of these represent their hope for a better “retirement” when they returned to Brazil. 
1.2.2. Immigration policy 
While immigrants make decision of leaving because of economic concerns, the “where” question is 
mostly related to the governmental policies. For immigration policies, the Japanese government 
passed a new law in 1990, which aimed to attract Brazilian-Japanese to return, as a solution of 
labour shortage. 6  This opened a more accessible door for the Brazilian-Japanese’s return. 
Regarding the immigrants’ policy, there is no apparent inclination on the Japanese government’s 
immigrants’ policy. 
1.2.3. Cultural factors 
To immigrants, cultural factors are crucial in two folds. Firstly, immigrants are concern about 
whether the designation generally accepts new comers. If not desirable, new comers may suffer 
from discrimination and social exclusion from the main-stream community. Secondly, immigrants 
would also consider the size of population with the same ethnicity in the designation country. For 
example, the bigger such homogenous population is, the more likely a more established 
community (with restaurants, schools, etc.) pre-exists that can facilitate their adaptation.  
For Brazilian-Japanese, they have less concern on the cultural factors operating in Japan based 
on an assumption that their ancestors were originally from Japan. They presume a warm welcome 
                                            
6 Kingston, J. “Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan.” Routledge (2014), 220-221. 
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from the indigenous Japanese.7 They also expect an easy transition as with the Japanese way of 
life. 
2. Interest and significance of the study 
The initial interest of study came 
from a trip that one of the group 
members made to Sao Paulo, 
Brazil. During the stay, the 
member spent most of his leisure 
time in Liberdade, the Japan 
Town in the city. It was a huge 
amusement as a large number of 
Portuguese speaking Japanese in 
the city, living the Japanese way 
of life. In the work environment, 
there were also considerable 
Asian looking Brazilian with an 
obvious Japanese name. 
In the visit of Meseu da Imigracao 
Japonesa (Museum of Japanese 
                                            
7  Masterson, D. “The Japanese in Latin America (Asian American Experience).” University of 
Illinois Press (2003), 259. 
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Immigration), the member realized the deep root of the Japanese with Brazil since the nineteenth 
century. The exhibition also covered the migration flow of the Brazilian-Japanese in the recent 
decades. The declining root of Japanese culture among the Brazilian-Japanese, the move-back (to 
Japan) driven by economic incentives, and eventually the home-return (to Brazil) caused by the 
social identity. The attractive phenomenon that the second and third generation of Brazilian-
Japanese moved to Japan enthusiastically for a better prospect, but eventually returned back to 
Brazil would require a deeper analysis on the superficial events. As the member shared the 
observation with the other team members, they have a strong determination to understand the 
reason of these happenings. 
3. Uniqueness of Brazilian-Japanese migration 
Brazilian-Japanese movement between Brazil and Japan have not been a popular study subject 
academically. However, the interesting fact we must note is that the Brazilian-Japanese cannot get 
used to living and working with the same ethnicity. 
It is observed and suggested by scholars that Brazilian-Japanese in Brazil are generally seen as 
Japanese who live with their own way and virtues. However, when this group of “Japanese” stay 
among with the Japanese back in the “motherland”, they realize that they are actually two distinct 
groups of people. The difference is serious to an extent that it finally leads to many of their home-
return to Brazil.8 
                                            
8  Lesser, J. “Searching for Home Abroad: Japanese Brazilians and Transnationalism.” Duke 
University Press Books (2003), 153-155. 
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When their grandparents or great-grandparents first left Japan for Brazil, they thought that they 
would return one day. Although the dream was actualized only by their third or even fourth 
decedents, it was still a well-received phenomenon given the welcoming attitude by the Japanese 
government at the beginning. 
Nonetheless, the coin flip around again as the group of Brazilian-Japanese struggled in their 
professional and social life in Japan.9 Their decision in staying in Japan for good faded out again 
given the uneasy life in Japan. This also caught the Japanese government in surprise. Tokyo 
eventually provided a policy with financial incentive to ask the Brazilian-Japanese to leave for 
Brazil again.10 
4. History of Japanese migration 
4.1. Phase I – First migration to Brazil (before WWII) 
In the late nineteenth century, the Meiji government started moving its people to countries in the 
North America and Australia. It was seen as a solution to address various problems including the 
rapid increase in population as well as the flawed agricultural reform during the time. 11  The 
                                            
9 Avelar, I., and Dunn, C. “Brazilian Popular Music and Citizenship.” Duke University Press Books 
(2011), 159. 
10 Masters, Coco. "Japan to Immigrants: Thanks, But You Can Go Home Now". TIME., 2013. 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892469,00.html. 
11 Bucerius, S., and Tonry, Michael. “The Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration.” 
Oxford University Press (2013), 740-741. 
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Japanese government even set up public organisations for the immigration purpose, namely imin-
dantai and imin-gaisha. 
Due to the anti-Japanese movements in the Canada and the US, the Japanese people started 
moving to South America. The pioneer was Kasato Maru, which was the ship that brought the first 
batch of Japanese immigrants to Sao Paulo in 1908. Since then, there were 190 thousands of 
Japanese immigrants arriving in Brazil by the year of 1941. 
The Japanese emigrants who moved to Brazil mainly worked in farmlands, supporting the growth 
of the coffee, cotton and silk industries. They had to tolerate the hard work conditions and poor 
living standards, making them realize that the life in Brazil was not desirable as expected. There 
have been some early immigrants starting up their own ventures in the city centre of Sao Paulo 
(Liberdade today), which gradually transformed the working class of these Brazilian-Japanese from 
the primary industry to the secondary industry.  
The tipping point for the Brazilian-Japanese to localize is about the President Getulio Vargas. He 
launched policies with strict controls on foreign residents. As such, the Japanese language 
education and publication were strictly banned.12 During the WWII, Brazil even suspended the 
diplomatic relations with Japan. With the shut-down of the Japanese embassy, the Brazilian-
Japanese population were completely separated from their motherland. 
                                            
12  Adachi, Nobuko. “Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents and Uncertain 
Futures.” Routledge (2006), 114. 
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4.2. Phase II – Settlement of Japanese in Brazil (1950s to 1970s) 
After the WWII, the isolation of the Brazilian-Japanese still prevailed in the first decade. After the 
normalisation of the bilateral relationship, the Japanese government relaunch the immigration 
policy in the year of 1953. From that point to 1973, over 60 thousands of Japanese people 
migrated to Brazil. At this stage of the immigration history, more Brazilian-Japanese move up their 
social status from farmers to other fields. As the families of the first batch of immigrants had their 
third generation already, these local-born Brazilian-Japanese started to receive education in 
Portuguese. 
The education and integration with the local society allow the third-generation descendants to 
become successful in various professions including legal field, public service, science and medical 
study. Gradually Brazilian-Japanese had received recognition from the general Brazilian public.13 
The Portuguese education also contributed to the better integration. In the contrast, Brazilian-
Japanese become less fluent in Japanese language. 
4.3. Phase III – Return Migration to Brazil (1980s to 2000s) 
Although Brazilian-Japanese started to thrive in Brazil with growing social mobility, they still were 
adversely impacted by the deteriorated economy in the early 1980s. The Brazil economy was out-
of-control with a rocket high inflation, while the Japan economy was having a contrast growth. 
Logically, this led to a part of the Brazilian-Japanese to move back to Japan to look for better work 
opportunities. Japan companies also realized that the Brazilian-Japanese are a cheap and strong 
work force to tap. 
                                            
13 Lone, S. “The Japanese Community in Brazil, 1908 – 1940.” Palgrave Macmillan (2002), 90. 
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Due to the growing inflow of Brazilian-Japanese, Tokyo launched a special identity of nikkeijin to 
allow the Japanese who have migrated to foreign countries, as well as their posterity to acquire the 
“permanent resident” abode with only limited conditions of their economic activities in the country 
of Japan. After this policy came out in 1990, even more population from Brazil decided to move to 
Japan for a better work opportunity. The inflow gave rise to a fast development of the Portuguese-
speaking circles in a number of Japan cities, namely Toyota, Hamamatsu, Oizumi and Ohta.14 
In mid-1990s, about 160 thousand Brazilian-Japanese were living in Japan, which made up 10 
percent of all Brazilian-Japanese. These Brazilian-Japanese can barely speak fluent Japanese. 
4.4. Phase IV – Re-emigration to Brazil (2009 to present) 
The financial statistics tell us the significance of the movement of the Brazilian-Japanese in Japan. 
The data of the Inter-American Development Bank shows that bank transfer from Japan to Brazil in 
the year of 2006 reached 2.6 billion USD. In mid-2000s, 20 percent of all Brazilian-Japanese were 
living in Japan.15  
In spite of the positive economic value these Brazilian-Japanese generated in Japan, it is observed 
that a significant part of the population eventually moved back to Brazil. It does not represent that 
they have earned enough capital to start their own business in Brazil or could be able to sustain a 
better quality of life than before. This indirectly reflected that these returning Brazilian-Japanese 
left Japan earlier than they planned. From the empirical clues, Brazilian-Japanese have a 
                                            
14 Weiner, M. “Japan's Minorities: The illusion of homogeneity (Sheffield Centre for Japanese 
Studies/Routledge Series).” Routledge (2008), 209. 
15 Ishikawa, Y. “International Migrants in Japan: Contributions in an Era of Population Decline.” 
Trans Pacific Press (2015), 244. 
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diminishing identity of themselves (as a Japanese in Japan society). We will discuss in details in 
the next part. 
5. Diminishing Identity of Japanese Diaspora in 
Brazil 
Not surprisingly, the warm acceptance was absent from the local Japanese. Despite with the close 
physical outlook and existing relative/family ties with the locals, Brazilian-Japanese are generally 
seen as foreigners. It is understood that Japanese generally tends to be more cohesive to their 
own race, however it is an interesting phenomenon to see that Japanese are also being a bit 
hostile to the returned Japanese. In latter chapters, we would further investigate this point and the 
implications to the broader Japan society. 
Local Japanese people have more lenient expectation to other foreigners as European and 
American immigrants did not embrace Japanese culture before. They do have high expectation to 
Brazilian-Japanese because of their Japanese ethnicity. At the end of the day, the integration was 
not desirable as the actually situation disappoints the locals. 
As a result, it is uneasy for the Brazilian-Japanese (including the workers and their family) to 
integrate the life in companies, schools and general Japanese society. The diminishing identity is 
in two-fold: After moving to Japan, Brazilian-Japanese experienced a stronger Brazilian identity 
and a weaker Japanese identity.  
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From the cities we named in Phase III, we could see the demographic distribution of the Brazilian-
Japanese in Japan. They are mostly where the auto-mobile, electronic appliance manufacturer are 
located. It reflected that Brazilian-Japanese could only work as blue collar class. 
It is widely recognized by the Japan society that Brazilian-Japanese generally work in the “3K” jobs 
(“kitsui” (arduous), “kitanai” (dirty) and “kiken” (dangerous)). These jobs mainly do with industrial 
assembling, food production and basic services like cleaning and selling.16  
The lack of social mobility as immigrants is obvious. Japanese companies are reluctant to hire 
Brazilian-Japanese for good positions that require language proficiency. Skilled labour of the 
Brazilian-Japanese also does not have the opportunity to work in their profession in Japan. With 
good education level, a large part of the Brazilian-Japanese was the middle class back in Brazil, 
they instead turn into underclass working in blue collar jobs in Japan.  
In the Japanese cities where Brazilian-Japanese mainly live in, the restaurants selling classic 
Brazilian meal, Samba music and pop culture products are everywhere. Comparing with their 
ancestor language and entertainments, it is clear that Brazilian-Japanese enjoy the culture they 
adapted for the past few decades. 
Apart from the fact that Brazilian-Japanese have their own Portuguese TV channel and newspaper. 
These media mainly provide Portuguese contents and information that talk about Brazilian-
Japanese population in Brazil and Japan.17 The attachment they have with Brazilian culture give 
                                            
16 Weiner, M. “Race, Ethnicity and Migration in Modern Japan.” Routledge (2004), 101-102. 
17 Hirabayashi, L. “New Worlds, New Lives: Globalization and People of Japanese Descent in the 
Americas and from Latin America in Japan.” Stanford University Press (2002), 259. 
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rise to the cultural clashes with the local Japanese. The lack of manner (speak loudly, play samba 
music, lack of environmental sense) reinforce the locals that Brazilian-Japanese only resemble 
them with the outlook only. From the perspective of the Brazilian-Japanese, they also realize that 
although their “hardware” is Japanese, however their “software” is apparently made in Brazil. 
Therefore, Brazilian-Japanese started to think that they are the Brazilian minority living in Japan. 
The lack of social interactions with the local community led to unhappy life, that the Brazilian-
Japanese appreciate all the components (samba, Brazilian food, Portuguese content) that would 
give them a better feeling in the life in Japan. All these ultimately contributed to a more detached 
way of life of the Brazilian-Japanese. 
6. Revisiting push-pull model 
6.1. Introduction of the model 
In revisiting theories of migration, Ravenstein’s laws of migration is perhaps the most common one 
to start with. It is said to be one of the most pioneering migration theories, but still prevails in 
today’s context. Originally, they can be summarised into six aspects: (1) most migration is in short 
distances; (2) for those going a long distance, migrants are mainly attracted by industrial and 
commercial activities of big cities; (3) most immigration is from rural to urban areas; (4) most 
immigration is incremental; (5) most long distance migrants are male; and (6) most migration is 
19 
economically-driven.18  Among all, the last aspect is the most considered one in the study of 
modern international migration. 
Despite not explicitly, the theory inherits the fundamental principle of the individual rational-choice 
theory that individuals make choices rationally or based on economic factors which are known to 
them. Its ancestral lineage is particularly manifest in the push-pull model dominating much 
migration school of thoughts in the twentieth century. Based on a “neo-classical economic 
equilibrium perspective”, the model is very simple to understand: migration is mainly driven by a 
set of push factors and a set of pull factors.  
As for push factors, operating in the sending country or the country of the origin (i.e. where 
immigrants originally grow up and live), they are forceful enough to motivate people to leave the 
country. In the context of individual rational-choice theory, push factors are generally economical: 
unemployment, low income, few opportunities, poverty, poor medical care and landlessness. They 
can also be other than economic reasons: for example, civil wars (e.g. conflicts in Syria), spread of 
terrorism (e.g. the Islamic State), political instability and fear and natural disasters. Nevertheless, 
push factors are mostly economic factors in the context of the neoclassicalism. 
On the other hand, pull factors operating in the receiving country or the country of the destination 
are attractive enough to encourage people to go in. Similar to push factors, they are mostly 
economical in nature: better employment and career prospects, better living conditions, higher 
income, higher social status, etc. 
                                            
18 Ravenstein, E. G. "The Laws of Migration." Journal of the Statistical Society of London 48, no. 2 
(1885): 167-227; and Ravenstein, E. G. "The Laws of Migration." Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society 52, no. 2 (1889): 241.-301. 
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The following is an attempt of the application of the push-pull model to the return migration (phase 
III) and re-emigration (Phase IV) of Brazilian-Japanese. 
6.2. Return Migration to Brazil (Phase III) 
Time is back to when the economic development of Japan and Brazil were still in full gear. Both 
countries shared their reputation as “miracle economies”: recording doubt-digit gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rate far exceeding the world’s average of the time. With different historic 
background, Japan first became a leading developed economy while Brazil caught up slightly 
afterwards. The Brazilian miracle was largely because of an “inconvenient truth” that the 
authoritarian military dictatorship, ruling the country in between 1964 to 1985, provided stability to 
rapid economic development. 
Brazilian-Japanese also shared the fruitfulness of the country’s economic success. Their ancestors’ 
home country, Japan, also bought them a positive image. In the late 1970s, Brazilian-Japanese 
had become the most successful descendants of immigrant groups in Brazil, with the social status 
largely improved when compared to their ancestors’. 
Similar to other fast-growing economies of the time, the Brazil’s development engine was fuelled 
by foreign loans provided by commercial banks of Western countries. It was an aggressive but very 
effective investment strategy to gear the economy. Yet, the down side was that excessively raising 
public debts would cause prolonged and huge trade and current account deficits. Eventually, the 
Brazilian government had no choice but to increase liquidity to write off debts: i.e. simply by 
printing money. As economics 101 told us, this would lead to inflation, or even worse, 
hyperinflation. Starting from the 1980s, Brazil was in hyperinflation for the consecutive 14 years, 
with triple-to-four-digit annual rates of inflation. The variability of hyperinflation was particularly high 
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in the second half of the 1980s. Rates of inflation climbed from 226 percent in 1985, to 1,430 
percent in 1989, and crazily up to 2,947 percent in 1990 (Table 1). In some 20 years, Brazil went 
through three currencies, the second cruzeiro, cruzado, cruzado novo and the third cruzeiro  
Year Rate of Inflation (%) 
1980 100 
1981 100 
1982 100 
1983 138 
1984 192 
1985 226 
1986 147 
1987 228 
1988 629 
1989 1,430 
1990 2,947 
1991 432 
1992 951 
1993 1,928 
1994 2,076 
1995 66 
Table 1: Rate of Inflation in Brazil (1980-1995)19 
                                            
19 IMF Financial Statistics. 
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To cope with the persistently high rates of hyperinflation, a policy of increasing interest rates was 
adopted.  However, the policy was at the expense of foreign investment and business expansion. 
Supplemented by the oil crisis in the 1980s, foreign direct investment (FDI) nearly stagnated. As a 
result, the yearly growth rate in the 1980s averaged 1.5 percent, which was at the historic low 
since the era of Brazilian Empire (Table 2). 
Period Characterisation 
Growth Rate (%) Growth Rate 
Per Capita (%) Population GDP 
1821-1890 Empire 1.65 1.95 0.30 
1891-1929 Oligarchic Republic 2.18 3.13 0.92 
1930-1980 
Desenvolvimentista 
Era 
2.62 5.74 3.03 
1981-1993 Hyperinflation 1.87 1.48 -0.39 
1994-2000 Adjustment Era 1.38 3.05 1.65 
1500-2000 Overall 1.04 1.57 0.53 
Table 2: Growth Rates in Brazil (1821-2000)20 
On the far opposite side of the Pacific Ocean, Japan was experiencing the most fruitful period of its 
post-war economic recovery. In the first 30 years since the end of the Pacific War, Japan’s annual 
growth rate averaged 7.9 percent. In the early 1980s, the global economy was crashed by the oil 
crisis. While Brazil was embracing the start of the prolonged economic downturn, Japan’s economy 
still remained relatively strong, with the average growth rate of 3.3 percent exceeding the world’s 
average of the time. Table 3 below shows the different fates of two countries in the 1980s. 
                                            
20 Ditto. 
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Country 1931 – 1950 1951 – 1981 1981 – 1993 1994 – 2000 
Brazil 4.6 6.8 1.4 3.1 
Argentina 2.9 3.4 1.0 2.6 
Mexico 4.1 6.4 1.7 3.1 
Chile 2.7 3.4 3.5 5.6 
Korea 0.6 7.5 7.2 5.3 
Japan 1.6 7.9 3.3 1.1 
U.S. 3.2 3.6 2.2 3.9 
Latin America 3.6 5.2 1.7 3.1 
World 1.8 4.5 2.6 3.4 
Table 3: Growth Rate of the World (1931-2000)21 
As previously discussed, by upholding the value of hardworking and treasuring education, 
Brazilian-Japanese improved their living a lot in the host country. Among all, some of them had 
even a better living than the indigenous Brazilians. Yet, they could not escape from the worldwide 
economic crisis and country-wide hyperinflation. Inspired by the Japanese remarkable economy, 
they saw their “home country” a way out from their sufferings. Tsuda suggested that the desperate 
prospect of Brazilian economy led to the subsequent bulks of Brazilian-Japanese moving to 
Japan.22 As our argument develops, the push-pull linkage of their return migration became obvious: 
the shrinking Brazilian economy pushed them to leave Brazil whilst the booming Japanese 
economy pulled them to move to Japan. 
                                            
21 Ditto. 
22  Tsuda, T. “Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in 
Transnational Perspective.” New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 
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Since the outbreak of Brazilian economic crisis, hundreds of thousands of Brazilians left their 
countries for the United States, followed by Japan and several European countries in pursuit for 
job opportunities.23 In the early 1990, the Diet of Japan (the Japanese Parliament) passed a new 
migration law with a view to further encouraging Brazilian-Japanese going back to Japan. On 1st 
June 1990, Japanese Ministry of Justice revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, 
in which a new long-term visa type was created for engaging nisei and sansei of nikkeijin (i.e. the 
second and third generation of descendants of Japanese emigrants) moving to Japan mainly with 
no restriction on finding jobs in the country. The relaxation of the constitutional limitation on 
emigration was revisionary. It was made in response to the domestic demand for cheap and docile 
labour which could solve the country’s labour shortage and with regards to the country’s “racial and 
social homogeneity”.24 
Since then, a large number of descendants of Japanese emigrants moved to Japan. According to 
statistics of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Japanese Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), there was an upsurge in the population of the nikkenjin from 1990 
(fewer than 5,000) to 2006 (some 300,000).25 
                                            
23 Margolis, Maxinc L. "Little Brazil: An Ethnography of Brazilian Immigrants in New York City." 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
24 Yamanaka, Keiko. "New Immigration Policy and Unskilled Foreign Workers in Japan." Pacific 
Affairs 66, no. 1 (1993): 72-90. 
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “MOFA: Japan-Brazil Relations.” Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2015). 
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6.3. Re-emigration to Brazil (Phase IV) 
From the economic perspective, the year of 2008 was a nightmare to the world. A series of 
incidents including the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as well as bursting of the U.S. housing 
bubbles and credit crisis clashed the world’s economy. And both Brazil and Japan could not stand 
alone from it.  
As for Japan, being stuck in the “Ushinawareta Nijūnen” (The Lost 20 Years), the country’s growth 
far lagged behind the global average. Japan has been running into deficit for decades given the 
chronic deflation and low growth. Local companies were in difficult times, with their leading position 
challenged by rivalries in neighbour countries like South Korea and Taiwan. In order to maintain 
their competitiveness, they had to cut the cost by replacing many of their staff with temporary 
workers, mostly filled by immigrants like Brazilian-Japanese. As of 2009, these workers accounted 
for over 30 percent of the entire labour force. Under the gloomy economy, Brazilian-Japanese was 
already the lucky one as replacement for normal labour force in companies. 
Yet, it was too early to conclude their luckiness. In fact, Japan was hit particularly hard by the 2008 
global financial crisis. It chilled the country’s economy further, with the growth rate dropping from 
2.2 percent in 2007, to -1 percent in 2008 and down to 5.5 percent in 2009. These rates were 
much lower than the world’s average (Table 4).26 Companies had to sack local employees, not to 
mention immigrants. Having no specific job skill or mostly working in job types which were highly 
replaceable, Brazilian-Japanese had a strong sense of job insecurity and no bargaining power to 
keep their jobs. As a quick conclusion, the current employment prospect is much worse than the 
time when the remigration started over 20 years ago. 
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The Brazilian economy was also hit by the 2008 crisis, but relatively gently when compared to 
Japan. Its growth rate plummeted from 6.1 percent in 2007 down to zero in 2009, followed by a 
significant rebound to 7.5 percent in 2010 (Table 4).27 The real challenge, however, was yet to 
come. Starting from the year of 2013, the country was struggled by chaotic politics, making the 
country’s economy worse than feared. In an announcement in March 2016, the Brazil's central 
bank expected the Brazilian economy to shrink by some 3 percent. Besides, the overall 
unemployment rate climbed up to over 11 percent in ends 2016 and is expected to rise further. 
And unemployment was particularly severe in the younger generation, with the rate reaching over 
25 percent in the first quarter of 2016.28 
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Year Japan Brazil World 
2007 2.2 6.1 4.3 
2008 -1 5.1 1.8 
2009 -5.5 -0.1 -1.7 
2010 4.7 7.5 4.3 
2011 0.5 3.9 3.1 
2012 1.7 1.9 2.5 
2013 1.4 3 2.4 
2014 0 0.1 2.6 
Table 4: Growth Rate of Japan and Brazil (2007-2014)29 
Our above discussion shows that both countries were in a difficult time since the 2008 global 
financial crisis and the uncertain situation continues. Despite no obvious causal linkage and push-
pull correlation observed, a considerable number of Brazilian-Japanese decided to re-emigrate or 
had been re-emigrated to Brazil upon years of stay in Japan. At the same time, the Japanese 
government provided incentives to immigrants from Latin America, who pledged not to pursue 
employment in Japan: offering subsidy for buying air-tickets and allowance of USD$2000 to each 
immigrants.  
6.4. Model review 
The Ravenstein’s laws of migration shows the neoclassical economics paradigm.  As King 
suggested, depending on the principles of “utility maximisation”, “rational choices” and “factor-price 
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distinction” between sending countries and receiving countries.30 The push-pull model succeeding 
the Ravenstein’s laws remains influential and attractive to scholars nowadays, partly because of its 
analytical and pragmatic approach. Samers commented that such approach largely relied on 
methodological individualism, treating individual migrants purely as the unit of analysis.31 
However, we consider that the push-pull model is unable to practically contribute to the study of 
migration pattern of Brazilian-Japanese in at least five aspects, namely (1) excessively 
neoclassical exclusiveness; (2) absence of social-cultural factors; (3) inability of explaining specific 
migration pattern; (4) empirical generalisation; and (5) inability of suiting modern migration reality.  
6.4.1. Excessively neoclassical exclusiveness 
First, the push-pull model is too economic-oriented. Recalling its ancestral linkage to the laws of 
migration, the model cannot go beyond what Ravenstein considered as the only meaningful, 
determining factor of migration – economic factors. This has been inviting criticism all along. 
Samers thought that Ravenstein’s laws were too “economically deterministic”, “methodologically 
individualist” and “dreadfully antiquated”.32  
We agree that the model somehow effectively illustrates economic reasons behind return migration 
of the Brazilian-Japanese (Phase III). Nevertheless, the push-pull approach normally assumes that 
disadvantaged individuals or groups in a society will be more likely to emigrate. To our surprise, 
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according to Tsuda, most of the Brazilian-Japanese emigrants were middle class, well educated, 
and socially integrated in the Brazilian society.33 They looked for something other than economic 
benefits, in which the model could not explain. Our latter finding will show that Brazilian-Japanese 
identity (or imagined identity) as Japanese are conducive in their decision-making on return 
migration to Japan and subsequent re-emigration to Brazil. 
At the time when living experience in Japan was a big disappointment to Brazilian-Japanese and 
they started re-emigrating to Brazil in 2009, the push-pull correlation was not manifest. Concerning 
push factors, it was arguable that they did exist. For example, in such a society with racial and 
cultural homogeneity, the identity as Brazilian-Japanese or nikkeijin did not help them win much 
respect from local Japanese or have any privilege over other immigrants. Conversely, this unique 
identity was simply a label of not being nihonjin (the Japanese). This de facto discrimination 
stopped them from integrating into local communities and pushed them leaving the country. 
However, it operated as a cultural factor, not an economic one. From the economic perspective, 
although the country continued to lose its momentum of economic development, as the name of 
“Lost Decades” suggested, the nikkenjin mostly working as three K jobs still had better 
remuneration when compared to those having similar jobs in Brazil. Put it in another way, there 
was no strong economic attraction in Brazil pulling them back. Therefore, there should be 
something falling out of the push-pull model drove them moving back to Brazil. Any quick 
conclusion on the phrase IV remigration simply by the model deems not justified but cursory. 
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6.4.2. Absence of social-cultural factors 
Second, the push-pull model totally disregards socio-cultural factors, and in particular, identity and 
norms socially constructed. King summarised many critical commentaries that the “determinism”, 
“functionalism” and “ahistoricism” of the model worked far from a migration reality.34 The model 
does not pay attention to how the identity of immigrants and locals of the receiving countries 
interact each other and then shape, either explicitly or implicitly, the migration pattern. It also does 
not acknowledge the fact that norms operating in receiving countries determine the integration 
degree of new immigrants into local communities. 
During the return migration (Phase III), with their embedded and imagined identity as Japanese 
inheriting from their ancestors, nikkenjin preferred Japan over other countries as the destination of 
migration. According to Tsuda, many Brazilian-Japanese in fact were well-educated, bourgeoisies 
and economically secured. They were even considered as better-off by indigenous Brazilians. 
Tsuda further described them as “socioeconomically privileged positive minorities” in Brazil.35 Still, 
such pride could not stop them from pursuing their “dreamed” life by moving to Japan. Obviously, 
their choice of migration could not be explained purely by the individual rational-choice theory.  
On the other hand, as their identity subsequently changed, Brazilian-Japanese re-emigrated to 
Brazil regardless of their economic benefits earned, i.e. remittance, by continuing to stay in 
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35  Tsuda, T. “Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in 
Transnational Perspective.” New York: Columbia University Press (2003), 66-7. 
31 
Japan.36 Such decision was made based on their full understanding that no matter how much they 
integrated into the local communities, they were seen as nikkenjin at most, if not gaijin (outsiders) 
or gaikokujin (foreigners).37 
6.4.3. Inability of explaining specific migration pattern 
Third, as Castles and Millers agreed, the push-pull model fails to explain the specific pattern of 
migration and why a group of migrants prefer a certain destination of migration over others.38 
Arguing that this model is unable to explain “the propensities of various groups of immigrations”, 
Portes and Borocz believed that there was a “prexisting” relationship between the sending country 
and receiving country affecting the migration pattern.39 For instance, immigrants moving to the 
Netherlands mostly came from the Dutch’s former colonies such as countries of Latin America and 
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Indonesia archipelago. The “preexisting” relationship can be in three forms: (1) physical coercion 
including conquest; (2) economic inducement; and (3) historical connection.40  
To some extents, the Portes-and-Borocz model successfully supplements to the weakness of the 
push-pull model and illustrates why Japanese diaspora in Brazil chose to move back to their home 
country rather than to other developed countries with the similar stage of development. Portes and 
Borocz did acknowledge experience, which immigrants obtained after migration, would in turn 
affect the subsequent migration pattern of the group of immigrants.41 This echoes with our previous 
discussions that after moving to and living in Japan for some years, Brazilian-Japanese was largely 
upset by cultural difference and unwelcomeness from the locals. In contrast to the pre-migration 
impression on their dreamed “homeland”, experience Brazilian-Japanese literally obtain after 
arrival told them that they were different to the locals, appeared to be outsiders, and did not belong. 
Such lack of a sense of belonging then led to a wave of their re-migration to Brazil, catalyzed by 
the Japanese government’s allowance policy in 2009. Yet, we consider that Portes and Borocz left 
unfinished answers. For example, while immigrants obtain a range of experiences during their stay 
in the receiving country, do all of these experiences share equally weights in determining the 
migration pattern or preference? If no, what is the key determining factor? 
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6.4.4. Empirical generalisation 
Furthermore, the push-pull model is an empirical generalization rather than a real law or theory. 
Any revisiting of migration theories does not undermine the importance of the model. It is just a 
simple, straightforward model to apply. It is particularly effective in identifying relevant economic 
factors, among others, leading to a particular migration and operating between receiving and 
sending countries. But also because of its own internal logic and elegant simplicity42, we could say 
that it is nothing more than an “organised” and “systematic” description, without any explanation on 
the migration phenomenon in principle. 
6.4.5. Inability of suiting modern migration reality 
Lastly, the push-pull model is too dated in explaining the modern international migration. Regards 
should be given that it operates based on the Ravenstein’s laws of migration that was promulgated 
in the nineteenth century. Stephen Castles and Mark Miller argue that nowadays is a period during 
which international migration has been accelerating, globalizing, feminizing, diversifying and 
becoming increasingly politicized. On the other hand, the world is more globalised but concurrently 
fragmented in the light of the rise of localism, nativism and nationalism.43 For instance, the rise of 
hegemonic China is challenging the equilibrium of the Asia-Pacific and does not yet bring closer 
partnership and integration of countries in the region. Rather, it reinforces some of the Japanese 
nationalists’ call that Japan is still the most homogeneous society in the world.  
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7. Constructivism and the role of identity in 
international migration  
Given the drawbacks illustrated, we argue that under the backdrop of globalisation, one’s identity 
should no longer be bound to his birthplace, thus a phenomenon of de-territorialisation and cross-
breeding of identity is observed. Therefore, we argue that international migration should also be 
affected by one’s change in identity recognition. 
Although one’s identity is heavily influenced by one’s living environment, brought up process and 
core value, it is by no mean solely personal, which would otherwise render each migration an 
unitary case and render the research anecdotal, inconclusive and non-explanatory in another 
extreme. Instead, migrants usually tend to define their identity by attaching themselves to 
reference groups which they consider to be best represented by. 
Each reference group entails a set of labels that describe the expected social behaviour, of its 
members and the values behind. For example, Japanese core value may be honesty, respectful, 
subtle while Brazilians will be passionate, outgoing and hedonic. The level of “Japaneseness” or 
“Brazilianness” depends on the extent you agree to the set of value and although identity formation 
is never a simple game of checking-the-box in the value list, it largely describes how an identity is 
generated from collective meanings agreed and how it is used to draw a line between “self” and 
“others”.  
Given the term “identity” is broadly used in a daily terms and often interchanged with other 
synonyms such as “personality”, “ethnicity”, “stereotype” etc. It is necessary for us to emphasize 
35 
that “identity” in this article is defined under the constructivist framework which carries a few 
specific properties. 
Unlike the term “stereotype”, identity is by no means a static concept. It is inherently relational and 
situated within a specific, socially constructed world, thus it is endogenous to the changes in the 
society’s environment and how one defines his own interests. Since a society is considered as a 
relatively stable structure of identity and interest, constructivists hold that while the government’s 
policy can affect people’s conception of how their identity is defined, it can be vice versa when 
one’s identity and idea is institutionalized and collectively recognized.44 Thus, the dynamics is 
“mutually constitutive”, albeit taking a relative long period of time and the incremental effect is 
probably not significant.45 
In the following chapter, we are going to re-visit the migration experience of the Brazilian-Japanese 
from the constructivism perspective and examine how their interaction with Japanese government 
and the local people affect their identity formation and transformation, hence their decision to leave 
or stay. 
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8. Migration pattern of Brazilian-Japanese from a 
constructivist’s perspective 
As aforementioned in Section 1, the migration of Brazilian-Japanese consists of three stages, 
namely (1) emigration to Brazil; (2) return migration to Japan; and (3) re-emigration to Brazil. Since 
the first emigration to Brazil took place in the 1900s (during the Meiji era), those emigrants simply 
did not have any idea of the destination they were going and left their home mainly due to 
economic incentives (or pressure). Even during the peak years from 1926 to 1935, emigrating 
Japanese only relied on the luring recruitment propaganda for labour. Therefore, we consider that 
the push-pull model have essentially explained in Part 2, thus the major focus here is the second 
and third migrations. 
8.1. Return Migration to Brazil (Phase III) 
Brazilian-Japanese began to return to Japan in the 1980s, at the heyday of Japan’s golden age 
and by coincidence, the economic predicament in Brazil after its spectacular growth in the 1970s. 
Subsidizing the basic industrial inputs such as steel, aluminium, petrochemicals, Brazil had 
fostered industrialization with mounting foreign debts and persistent trade deficits, leading to an 
economic crisis with hyperinflation. Unemployment rate was high and the standard of living of 
Brazilian-Japanese was inadvertently undermined. Hence, when working visas by the Japanese 
government were offered to them, it appears to be reasonable to say that their return to Japan is 
basically economically motivated, as explained by the push-pull model in Section 6. 
37 
Whilst the push-pull model has made a reasonable argument, it is always too hasty to come to a 
conclusion the motives of the Brazilian-Japanese are with merely pecuniary concern, not to 
mention the enormous opportunity costs forgone such as their jobs, kin ties and community 
memberships. Nonetheless, they were the nisei and sansei and had substantially completed the 
social assimilations. For instance, a survey taken in 1958 revealed that 75 percent of them were 
Catholics instead of Shindo or Japanese Buddhism and their most effective language of 
conversation was Portuguese.46 
8.1.1. Identity as Japanese 
The contending identity of “Brazilians” and “Japanese” are shaped by an array of factors and the 
components that makes one up for an issei (the first generation) and a nisei is different, even 
though they claimed to be the same. 
For the issei, many considered themselves as Japanese since their emigration at first was to make 
money and return home with ample savings. Even though they felt being abandoned and became 
a kimin (abandoned people) when they found out they could only work in coffee plantations, 
suffering from worse working and living conditions, their hostility was only limited to the Japanese 
government and it actually reaffirmed their desire to go home. Therefore, most of them regarded 
Brazil as a temporary place to stay and few opted to be citizens of Brazil, being unwilling to sever 
their relationship with their home country. It was not until the defeat of Japan in the WWII did the 
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issei change their mind and decide to live permanently in Brazil, however, the sense of 
Japaneseness remained strong.47 
For the nisei and sansei, their identity were more complex as they had been subject to both 
Japanese and Brazil’s influence since the day they were born. At home, the nisei were often 
reminded of their ethnicity by their parents (issei) and were taught to live up to Japanese virtue 
such as honesty, credibility and respect to others. Their home education was proven to be 
successful from their employers’ feedback in Brazil and the Brazilian-Japanese had soon built a 
reputation of being more honest and reliable in budget-keeping than the local Brazilians and even 
other immigrants from Italy, Germany and the Middle East etc. Adding that they received higher 
education, most of the Brazilian-Japanese had successfully integrated into the field of commerce, 
profession and politics, entering the middle class of Brazil.48  
8.1.2. Identity as Brazilians 
However intact the Brazilian-Japanese would like to remain in their identity, the Latin culture was 
playing a significant influence on them, especially for the nissei. In terms of schooling, the Brazilian 
government was also cautious of its ethnic purity and discouraged foreign language. Portuguese 
was the medium of instruction in nearly all of the schools and Japanese were only taught in rural 
areas where the Japanese community lived. All foreign languages were even banned under the 
dictatorship of Getulio Vargas in the 1940s. After the World War II, owing to the stronger sense of 
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assimilation need into their host country, the issei were much less reluctant to let their children 
acquire the Brazilian culture, instead, Portuguese became the mother tongue of nisei and 
migration towards large cities such as Sao Paulo, Parana, Pernambuco etc. had significantly 
increased for better education and living environment.49 
Similar trend is noted in the percentage of interethnic marriage between Japanese and Brazilians. 
On the issei’s arrival, most of the marriage was confined to their own community due to their 
exclusion from the locals. Even disregarding of racial prejudice, traditional Japanese culture 
emphasized the purity of blood and denounced the idea of zakkon (mixed marriage). However, 
their assertion appeared to be unrealistic when the there was a growing need for assimilation. 
Therefore, although the issei wished their children to follow suit, they soon found their attempt to 
avoid “mongrelization” was not feasible. It was also unnecessary when their relationship with their 
son/daughter in law continued to improve.50 
8.1.3. Dekasegis and imagination of Japanese identity 
It is shown that up until 1980, Japanese in Brazil had been brought up and living under heavy 
influences of both the host country and their distant home, and the reason why hundred thousands 
of them eventually decided to leave and became dekasegis must not be isolated from this social 
context. Whilst constructivists claim that identity can be formulated through institutionalisation of 
our daily lives, it would be hard to apply to migrants since they are, to a great extent, excluded 
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from the Japanese diaspora. As a result, before the arrival of internet, Brazilian-Japanese could 
only understand their home country through oral teachings from the elderlies and other secondary 
handed information like books and newspapers, together with most importantly, their imaginations. 
The role of imagination could never be underestimated, for the Brazilian-Japanese, in fact migrants 
of all culture, in building their ethnical identity. A migrant’s understanding of his country would most 
likely stay at the time of departure and less affected by the subsequent events at home. This can 
be evidenced in the internal classifications even within the Japanese community in Brazil, where 
those who came before WWII regarded themselves as kyu-imin (old immigrants), as opposed with 
the shin-imin (new immigrants) who came after the war. The pre-war groups considered 
themselves as truly “Meiji men and women” who held the genuine Japanese virtue while the 
latecomers are contaminated by other cultures.51 Despite of the internal differences within the 
Brazilian-Japanese, it is shown that the sense of Japaneseness is largely dependent on the 
intangible idea of Japanese culture and virtue, which tends to be positive. 
Similar experiences can also be found in the Greek immigrants in the United States. Although the 
country is much more prosperous and offers them a stable environment to live and grow, many 
Greeks still take pride in their ethnic identity and second-generation immigrants decide to return 
home. Their sense of belonging has little to do with the economic power but mainly originates from 
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the national pride of coming from Greece, the cradle of Western civilization and birthplaces of 
many remarkable philosophers.52 
Interestingly, the perception of Japaneseness is also reinforced by the local Brazilians. In addition 
to the Japanese character that is appreciated by many Brazilian employers aforementioned, the 
concept that Japanese belongs to the Primeiro Mundo (the first world of nation) is prevalent in 
Brazilian communities. They regard the immigrants are coming from a developed and lavish 
country which only comes after the United States and Europe. This perception culminated at the 
heyday of Japan’s economic miracle in the 1980s and cemented the sense of superiority of the 
Brazilian-Japanese.53 
Therefore, when the Japanese government spread their welcoming arms to the Brazilian-Japanese 
at the time of Brazil’s economic hardship in late 1980s, the recognition of their Japaneseness drew 
them a rosy picture that they could go home and share the prosperity with their long-separated 
compatriots or to the least extent, gave them much confidence that they would succeed in a 
country they were familiar with and easy to adapt to. 
8.2. Re-emigration to Brazil 
After staying in Japan for around 10 to 20 years, more and more Brazilian-Japanese moved back 
to Brazil, forming the third migration. This case is very uncommon in the world and the push-pull 
model employed in Section 6 appears to be inconclusive and incomprehensive. Thus we argue 
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that it is in fact where identity recognition comes into effect. If we regard it as a component factor in 
the first two phrases of migration, it should be treated as a dominating factor in the third one. In the 
following part we are going to articulate the Brazilian-Japanese’ daily interactions with the 
Japanese government and locals, how institutionalisation of idea operates inside the dynamic 
process and how does institutionalised idea eventually transform their Japanese identity. 
8.2.1. Institutionalised discrimination from locals 
Regarding themselves as Japanese, the Brazilian-Japanese expected that there would not be 
much difficulties to assimilate into their “homeland”. Yet, in no time did they discover that the social 
barrier put up by their compatriots was actually insurmountable, provided the long history of anti-
immigrations they had. 
The reason for Japan’s unwelcoming attitude towards immigrants is multi-faceted and it actually 
constitutes one of the significant parts of Japanese character. From the historical perspective, 
Japan had been an isolated country for more than 200 years since the 1630s when the Sakoku 
policy (closed country) was implemented by the Tokugawa Shogunate. During that time, trades 
were only limited to the Imperial China, Korean Kingdom, Ryu-kyu Kingdom and the Dutch 
merchants in designated “gateways”, which was secluded from the Japanese civilians. Foreigners 
could not enter Japan’s border and vice versa unless special permission. Adding to the 
geographical barrier, unofficial interaction between Japanese and foreigners had been scarce until 
43 
the arrival of the American Black Ships of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853, which forcibly 
opened the country to Western trading system.54 
The xenophobic sentiment swung to the other extreme when Emperor Meiji implemented a 
complete Westernization. Propaganda and education with strong nationalism element was 
implanted in the mind of many Japanese who turned out to regard themselves as more superior 
than her neighbours in the Asia Pacific, being a unique nation on par with the Great Powers in the 
West. Even after the WWII, the concept of nihonjinron (theories about the Japanese) was brought 
up again to restore and emphasize that Japan should embrace “healthy nationalism” on the road 
towards prosperity and modernity. Therefore, ethnic homogeneity remains popular in Japanese 
literature and a general scepticism towards immigrants is firmly institutionalised.55 
Although Brazilian-Japanese were ethnically Japanese, they were viewed by the locals for being 
more Brazilian than Japanese. Local Japanese considered their ancestors (the issei) were in fact 
losers who fled Japan, hence their return now implied that they could not make a living in Brazil 
neither. As a result, they were stigmatised as a “double loser” that were not qualified as a genuine 
Japanese. The locals’ prejudice was further reinforced and exaggerated by the media, which was 
keen to disinter bad stories about the immigrants to catch the locals’ eyeballs. When the economic 
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bubble was prickled in the 1990s, Brazilian-Japanese, together with other immigrants, were also 
blamed for the climbing of crime rate and unemployment.56 
Right wing politicians, at the meantime, felt much welcomed to act as fear mongers and attributed 
most of the economic hardship to the immigrants or the overall immigration policy, masking their 
own mistakes. In 2000, Shintaro Ishihara, Governor of Tokyo from 1999 to 2012, once made a 
blatantly offensive remark on the immigrants that shocked the international scene.57 However, 3 
years later, he still managed to be re-elected as the Governor with a vote of over 70 percent.58 As 
the anti-immigrant stance is not unpopular among local Japanese, even in Tokyo which is 
supposed to be most open under globalisation, the media and politicians would be reluctant to 
speak for the immigrants, including the Brazilian-Japanese, as long as the sentiment is not 
overwhelmed or even worked in their favour. 
 8.2.2. Institutionalization of entry of Brazilian-Japanese 
In light of the institutionalized discrimination from the locals, the Brazilian-Japanese found it hard to 
assimilate into the society. According to the survey conducted by Hamamatsu Foundation for 
International Communication Exchange, a NGO dedicated to promote mutli-culturalisation, there 
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are two major obstacles in assimilation for Brazilian-Japanese: (1) language barrier and (2) 
employment opportunities and treatment. 
Language barrier 
In Japan, owing to its mono-ethnicity, there is little need for a Japanese to acquire a second 
language and the majority only speaks Japanese with very limited English, not to mention 
Portuguese. The government’s spending on foreign education is also below the average of Asia.59 
In return, the Brazilian-Japanese could neither master Japanese very well and only 20 percent and 
6 percent consider their Japanese oral proficiency as moderate and fluent respectively while over 
20 percent did not know Japanese at all. 
The situation is even more worrying in terms of writing, since Japanese employs an extensive use 
of Kanji (Chinese characters), it poses a high hurdle for Brazilian-Japanese who primarily write 
Portuguese, which belongs to the Latin system, so that over 90 percent of them are unable to read 
Kanji and only 1 percent can write it.60 It is not surprising that this has led to a segregation between 
the Brazilian-Japanese and the mainstream society when almost everywhere in daily lives are in 
Japanese. 
From the psychological perspective, the impact of language barrier is more direct. Those who 
cannot speak Japanese would be easily given a cold shoulder or surprised look when the native 
Japanese realise someone who look like one of them but cannot speak their language. Even when 
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a Brazilian-Japanese is able to master a moderate level, it only takes the local a second or two to 
distinguish them from his accents and word choice. Then the locals will adjust their style and tone 
from talking to a compatriot to a more reserved conversation with a foreigner, which makes the 
Brazilian-Japanese feel that the society is not accommodating and indifferent.61 
Employment opportunities and treatment 
Due to their illiteracy in Japanese, Brazilian-Japanese can only work on jobs that require minimal 
level of Japanese, which means the aforementioned 3K jobs that are labourious and underpaid 
according to the Japanese standard. This makes a stark contrast to the middle class status and 
quality of living they used to enjoy in Brazil, undermining their self-esteem. Discrimination prevails 
in their workplace and they feel that they are treated unfairly mainly on two occasions. First, they 
are assigned by the employer to perform more labourious tasks than their local colleagues and 
second, they receive unequal compensation and reward such as lower paid and less promotional 
activities.  
Studies show that while some cases are true, most differential treatment is not their employer’s 
intent but the perception of the Brazilian-Japanese. The most common response from the 
employers is that they have no choice but to make such arrangement. As the Brazilian-Japanese 
are not proficient in Japanese, employers can only assign them to perform some easier tasks that 
need less instructions and cooperation with Japanese-specking counterparts. It also applies to the 
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case when deciding whom to promote as the language is very essential for a supervisor or 
manager level, where more clerical work is involved.62 
Although the employer’s rationale is valid, a survey of Hamamatsu Foundation for International 
Communication Exchange also shows that even a Brazilian-Japanese is able to read and write 
Japanese fluently, his/her chance of employment and promotion does not differ much with those 
who do not. It suggests that objective discrimination in workplace does exist, though it may not be 
as serious as the Brazilian-Japanese perceived.63 
For the Japanese government, the labour policy on migrant workers is consistent with its anti-
assimilation tradition and attitude. The crux of the problem is that they refused to create an 
immigration residency status for migrant workers, so that many of them resorted to the black 
market and being exploited. The government’s stance is predictable since they faced strong 
oppositions from different political parties, labour unions, business associations and the general 
public since the migrant workers are described as bottom-tier labour who will add much social 
burden.64 
The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act came into effect on 1 June 1990, which 
ruled that those who knowingly hire foreigners without valid visa will be criminally charged. 
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Although the new law granted the second and third generation descendants of Japanese, including 
the Brazilian-Japanese, a long term visa and permit to work, they were still bereft with the labour 
protection and rights enjoyed by their native counterparts. This is because although the labour right 
law and pension act do not clearly deny the Brazilian-Japanese’ rights, the law mentions that only 
gokumin (national Japanese) are covered. While the Japanese government remains lukewarm and 
equivocal to their plight, the Brazilian-Japanese can only continue to suffer from this 
institutionalised discrimination.65 
 
It is shown that both objective and subjective discrimination do exist at the same time. While 
objective discrimination is evident, we should not ignore the significance of the subjective 
discrimination that is actually perceived by the Brazilian-Japanese since according to 
constructivists, institutionalisation is an inter-subjective and reciprocal process. On one way the 
anti-assimilation background leads to local Japanese general disdain of foreigners, the Brazilian-
Japanese will also respond to the discriminations they perceived and the change the institutions in 
another way round. Studies have shown that Brazilian-Japanese, after years of segregation, has 
become more sensitive to the treatment they received and easily feel being looked down.66 This 
reflects how an institutionalized idea (e.g. discrimination) can shape one’s thought and behaviour 
and given the intensity is great enough, its identity. In the next part, we will focus on how the 
transformation of the identity of the Brazilian-Japanese actually takes place. 
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8.3. Transformation of Brazilian-Japanese identity 
With high aspirations that they could make a fortune and start a bright career in their homeland, 
the Brazilian-Japanese soon realise that it is merely their wishful thinking. Although the wages 
were higher in Japan, the pecuniary returns could not make up for their grievances due to 
discrimination received and miserable living and working environment, which made them suffer 
from severe cognitive dissonance. As identity is dynamic in nature, their imagined identity of 
Japanese had to be adjusted to the reality. Therefore, they became more reserved to claim 
themselves as Japanese and began to reassess their level of Japaneseness.  
At the same time, the Brazilian-Japanese discovered that their image was largely distorted in the 
mind of local Japanese. They realised that they were stigmatised as drifters who were incapable to 
make a living in either the soil of their home and host country, which significantly reduces their 
sense of belonging. On the other hand, the cultural identity of Brazilian-Japanese are also 
responsive to the psychological stimuli they received. Since they had completed the assimilation in 
Brazil before, their cultural identity had been firmly instilled inside and only remained unnoticeable 
when the ethnical identity of Japan was strong.67 
Much of their characters revealed that they were naturalised by the Brazilian culture. According to 
interviews with the local Japanese, Brazilian-Japanese are more open, outspoken and passionate, 
which showed an inherent difference with the restrained and subtle manner in the stereotype of 
Japanese. Adding to the cognitive dissonance suffered, the ethnical identity of the Brazilian-
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Japanese becomes less compatible with their cultural identity, an identity that they feel comfortable 
with and live up to every day.68 
The re-ignition of Brazilian-Japanese’ sense of Brazilians comes as the ethnical and cultural 
identity are put in a mutually exclusive situation where one must take side. According to their 
remarks, it usually happens when they find out the misconception of local Japanese about Brazil – 
both their birthplace and the source of cultural identity. To many local Japanese, Brazil is always a 
backward country with slums everywhere and people living a miserable life. The Brazilian-
Japanese would become furious and frustrated when they hear this kind of comments and they 
feel that they have the responsibility to defend for their country, and it is when they rediscover that 
they in fact embrace the Brazilian culture and the identity of Brazilian is even stronger than their 
ethnical identity.69  
Scholars name this phenomenon of developing a nation’s identity outside its border as de-
territorialised identity creation and there are also other evidences. Recall the Greek-American case 
mentioned in Part 8.1, similar to the Brazilian-Japanese in Japan, the descendants of the Greek 
immigrants also developed the de-territorialised identity of Greek in the United States when their 
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homeland was under Turkish invasion and they felt that they had the responsibility to defend their 
ancestry when it was under threat.70  
9. Implication 
After understanding the reasons behind the migration of Brazilian-Japanese, in this part, we are 
going to illustrate the impacts of Brazilian-Japanese on the Japanese society. First, it is important 
for us to examine the pros and cons of Brazilian-Japanese domestically, especially on the ageing 
problem. Since ageing is the most serious social problem in Japan nowadays, Brazilian-Japanese 
could be a strong support in the ageing working class to maintain the economic sustainability in the 
future. However, social problems like crimes committed by Brazilian-Japanese in Japan are the 
drawbacks we should not ignore. Therefore, providing friendly immigration and social welfare 
policies to help Brazilian-Japanese to settle down and make contributions to the society is the 
major consideration for the Tokyo government to solve these social problems.  
9.1. Demographic challenges in Japan 
Ageing is always the most serious social problem faced by the Japanese government. Japan has 
the highest proportion of elderly citizens in the world. In 2014, 33% of the Japanese population 
were above the age of 60, 25.9% are aged 65 or above and 12.5% are aged 75 or above. In the 
meantime, the number of young people (aged 14 or below) has been decreasing from 24.3% of the 
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population in 1975 to 12.8% in 2014.71 It is estimated from the current fertility rate that in 2060, 
there will be 40% of people aged 65 or above in the population and the total population will fall by a 
third from 128 million in 2010 to 87 million in 2060.72 Therefore, to alleviate the ageing population, 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe initiated a key advisory panel including government officials and 
intellectuals to tackle the ageing problem. The major goal of the advisory panel is to maintain 
Japan Japan's population — now around 127 million — at a level of more than 100 million in 50 
years by boosting the low birth-rate.73. 
There are two main reasons that cause an ageing Japanese society: the lowest fertility rate and 
highest life expectancy rate in the world.74 The fertility rate is the number of children born by each 
woman in her lifetime.  It reached its lowest in 2005 at 1.26, and went up to 1.42 in 2014. However, 
it is still far below the birth-rate necessary to maintain the total population of 2.04, which is a 
number never reached since 1973.75 
There are a various economic and cultural factors leading to the low birthrate in Japan. Besides, 
the working culture does not welcome working class women to have children, for example, there is 
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a lack of work-life balance due to long working hours, and overtime work is expected in order to 
show loyalty and studious attitude to companies and employers. According to data from the 
Japanese government, around 22% of Japanese work more than 49 hours per week, while only 
16% of North Americans and 11% of French and Germans work at the same amount of time.76 
Therefore, coupled with poor employment condition and small living spaces arising high population 
density especially in major cities, the cost of raising a child is extremely high in Japan.  
Another reason is that Japan has the highest life expectancy in the world, which is 87 years for 
women and 80 years for men. Resulting from improvements in medicine and nutrition, the life 
expectancy has been increasing since the end of World War II from 54 years for women and 50 for 
men. As we mentioned before, it has led to the proportion of the population aged 65 years old or 
above increasing steadily from the 1950s.77 
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Table 1: Birth and Death Rates of Japan (1950-2008)78 
Hence, the problems of ageing society would harm the productivity of the country. In social terms, 
aged dependency ratio is a ratio between those in a population not in the labour force (the 
dependent group, normally people aged above 65 years old) and those typically in the labour force 
(the productive group, normally aged 15-65) which supports the former group. If the ratio is too 
high, it means that the labour force is required to support more people who are not product.79 In 
2014, the aged dependency ratio of Japan was 40%, meaning that every five workers were 
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supporting two aged dependents. Yet, it is estimated that the ratio would increase to 60% by 2036 
and nearly 80% by 2060. Therefore, if Japanese government cannot find solutions to tackle the 
problems above, it is will be a vicious cycle that the working young people have to support more 
dependent people in the future, and encouraging them to not have children because of the heavy 
burden. 
Another social problem is that young people from rural area tend to move to Greater Tokyo to seek 
new opportunities instead of staying at hometowns. The Greater Tokyo area is the only locality for 
population growth in Japan because of immigration from other parts of the country.  As a result, 
between 2005 and 2010, the population in 36 of Japan’s 47 prefectures has shrunk by as much as 
5% and with nearly 8 million abandoned homes across the whole country, further damaging the 
economic sustainability of the rural area.80 Because of this migration pattern, a Japanese think 
tank estimated that half of the municipalities would disappear by 2040, especially on the decrease 
in number of young women in these places.81 Therefore, it would be a tough challenge for the 
Japanese government to solve the imbalance in social development to boost social dynamics. 
In economic terms, labour shortage is another hurdle on the path of Japan’s economic recovery. 
As in 2015, the demand for labour forces has exceeded the supply, which only there were only 100 
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job seeker for every 125 jobs82. This is certainly the consequence of an increasing number of 
retiring   older generation and decreasing number in young workers available in the labour market. 
With the low birth rate, the labour population and consumer population is expected to decrease, 
which further harms the economy. Hence, since 1980s, a number of large companies has realized 
the situation and extended the official retirement age from 55 to 60 or even 65 years old. 
Nowadays, some companies even allow their older workers to continue to work after official 
retirement to sustain the productivity. Another method that Japanese companies tried to adopt is 
an increase of participation from women workforce.83 In Japanese tradition, women would quit their 
job after getting married because they are expected to be full-time housewives to support their 
husbands to work outside.  If the woman still remains a proper job after getting married, people 
would doubt the ability of her husband to raise the family. However, it is a known fact that the 
participation of women in labour forces could exacerbate the decreasing birthrate since of working 
class women are less likely to give birth due to aforementioned reasons. A study of the UN 
Population Division commented that if Japan would like to maintain her workers-to-retiree ratio for 
economy growth, she has to raise its retirement age to 77, or allow 17 million number of net 
immigrant by 2050.84  But it is clearly to see that such changes are quite difficult to realize. For the 
first suggestion of raising the retirement age to such old age, welcoming immigrants seems to be a 
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more possible way to solve the problem which we are going to highlight in our later discussion on 
the Brazilian-Japanese situation. 
Also, ageing problem has a major impact on the government spending of Japan. Even if the 
government maintains the same level of social benefits as before, the number of increased elderly 
population would certainly cause a bigger burden on the public financial reserve. In the 1970s, the 
public cost of health care, pension and social welfares for the elderly was only 6% of total national 
income. In 1992, the proportion rose to 18% of total national income and it is predicted that 28% of 
the national budget would be spent on social services for aged people in 2025.85 If the Japanese 
government ignore the ageing problem, it would suffer from huge public service cost in the 
foreseeable future for aged people. 
Therefore, there are two suggestions that the Japanese government could contemplate to tackle 
the ageing society. First, as we mentioned beforehand, the government should encourage to 
increase the birth rate to 2.04 from 1.4. The second option would be, as the U.N. has projected, 
that the nation should allow 17 million immigrants by 2050 to maintain a productive economy.  
Needless to say, encouraging the public to have more children is a very extensive and 
comprehensive program and hence very difficult to operate, because the government should have 
full support with favourable policies and public services for promoting work-life balance, like tax 
allowance for new born babies and children day care centers to allow women to go back to the job 
market without hesitation. Yet, those policies might take a long time to be implemented. Hence, the 
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second option, which is promoting the immigrants to Japan, is definitely a more efficient way to 
boost up the economy with direct import of labour force.  
Actually in the United States, mass immigration is the solution to increase the total population and 
labour force in recent years from 0.5% to 1%,86 if counting only the fertility rate, the labour force 
would  just remain constant. 
 
Table 2: Change of Japanese Demographic (1950-2055)87 
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9.2. Why is Brazilian-Japanese a solution to Japan? 
Even Japan’s productivity and per capita gross domestic product rise in a considerable level, the 
total growth of economy would be still low or negative due to declining of population. Encouraging 
mass immigrants come to Japan is the direct and efficiency way to boost up the working force. 
However, first we should understand why it is so difficult for foreigners migrate to Japan and 
become a Japanese citizen and after understanding that, Brazilian-Japanese would be the best 
group of people to join the Japanese society and support the economy. 
9.2.1. Uniqueness of Japanese culture 
Japan is one of the countries in the world with the strictest regulation on immigration. Unlike the 
United States, there is no birthright citizenship law, which means even the child is born in Japan, 
since the child’s parents are not Japanese, the child could not obtain Japan’s citizenship.88 The 
Japan-born child would be a permanent foreigner unless he goes through the long process of 
naturalization. Besides, the government also protects local workers by limiting foreign labours to 
work in farms and workshops. Even at universities, only few programs are taught in English which 
could discourage the enrollment of foreign students, who will become Japan’s economic driver in 
the future.89 
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The uniqueness of the Japanese culture also makes them unwelcoming to the foreign immigrants. 
In 2014, 98.5% of total population in Japan is native Japanese.90 In 2008, an opinion poll by Asahi 
Daily showed that 65% of respondents opposed to a more open immigration policy.91 In fact, the 
Japanese government welcomes highly skilled migrants but many of them would rather choose 
Hong Kong or Singapore which are used to be accommodating and easy to adapt to their culture. 
Switzerland’s International Institute for Management Development conducted a survey of 
“attractiveness to foreign-born highly skilled professionals”, Japan only ranked 48th out of total 60 
countries. 92  The monoethnic tradition and culture created an unwelcoming image that is 
internationally known. 
The governments all over the world are attracting highly skilled labour from other countries to 
contribute to the society. Therefore, owing to its isolation policies and cultural uniqueness, hardly 
can Japan compete with other countries. Then, the major concern of Japan’s labour supply is not 
just a quality problem, rather it is a question of labour sufficiency. As explained before, it needs 17 
million immigrants by 2050 to maintain a productive economic growth. Hence, Brazilian-Japanese, 
who are ethnically Japanese, should face the least hostility and assimilation problem.  
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After understanding why other foreign immigrants might not be possible to move into Japan. Now, 
we are going to illustrate why Brazilian-Japanese are more suitable by their ethnic and historical 
background, their availability and the jobs they are capable of.  
9.2.2. Historical factors 
In the early twentieth century, Brazil faced labour shortage in coffee plantation and the Brazilian 
government mainly hired African slaves and European workers. Yet, due to poor working 
conditions and abolishment of slave trafficking, the local government has to think of new source of 
immigrants to fill the labour shortage in the coffee industry. On the other hand, industrialization of 
Japan boosted the population and many people were looking for new opportunities via moving 
overseas. Therefore, a number of Japanese migrated to Brazil to own or work for coffee 
plantations since then. Until now, there are approximately 1,600,000 Brazilian-Japanese. During 
1980s, Japan’s economy was undergoing its economic miracle, therefore many second or third 
generation of Brazilian-Japanese were incentivized to go to Japan, aiming to make a fortune.93 
Because of their Japanese ancestry, the Japanese government believed that Brazilians-Japanese 
would be more easily integrated into the Japanese society. In fact, their appearances are nearly 
the same as the natives because interethnic marriage was rare in their early days in Brazil. 
Therefore, their similarity in appearance makes them better assimilate into the Japanese society 
and culture than people from other countries. Moreover, they also understand more about the 
uniqueness of Japanese culture. It is found out from a survey that the local Japanese and 
Brazilian-Japanese have cultural differences in working norms, but it was not viewed as a 
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problem.94 Also, the government offers a long term and renewable working visa for Japanese 
ancestry from foreign countries, so after two to three renewals, the Brazilian-Japanese could apply 
for the permanent residency which is less difficult when compared to other foreign immigrants. In 
the table below, we could see that Brazilian-Japanese was the ethnic group with most “long term 
resident” visas in 2004. 
Place of birth 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Composition 
Ratio (%) 
Brazil 137,649 142,082 139,826 140,552 144,407 58 
China 37,377 36,580 35,020 33,292 32,130 13 
Philippines 13,285 15,530 18,246 21,117 23,756 10 
Peru 21,369 22,047 21,538 21,045 20,779 8 
South Korea 9,509 9,243 9,091 8,941 8,751 3 
Others 18,458 18,978 19,730 20,200 2,0911 8 
Total 237,607 244,460 243,451 250,147 250,794 100 
Table 5: Number of foreign resident with “long-term resident” visa (2001-2004)95 
Theoretically, the Brazilian-Japanese are more suitable for large-scaled immigrations for Japan. 
Actually, without proper and comprehensive support to the Brazilian-Japanese, they suffered from 
a lot of hardship. Under the government’s policies, as mentioned before, there is no citizenship for 
foreigners in Japan. And the new born babies of Brazilian-Japanese before meeting the minimum 
required years of stay were unable to claim Japanese nationality. Moreover, there is no favourable 
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policy to help Brazilian-Japanese to assimilate into the local society. For example, a large number 
of them could not speak fluent Japanese so that they could only work in manufacturing industry 
even they hold a university degree.96 The government do not provide support in teaching them 
Japanese.  
As a result, the Brazilian-Japanese live in clustered region and exclude themselves form the locals. 
Secondly, when Japan experienced economic downturn in 2000s with labour surplus, the 
Japanese government provided subsidies as a mean to induce them to return to Brazil. Every 
unemployed Brazilian-Japanese were entitled to a subsidy of $3,000 and $2,000 to each family 
member to return to their country of origin.97 Thus, it is not untrue that some of the Brazilian-
Japanese could stay and others do not view Japan as the place they could stay and pursue their 
careers. To sum up, when compared with other ethnic minorities, Brazilian-Japanese face less 
obstacle to assimilate into the Japanese society due to their shared ancestry and appearance. 
However, there is far more the government can do, which we will suggest in the later part. 
9.2.3. Potential labour force 
As projected by the United Nations, Japan needs at least 17 million net immigration by 2050 in 
order to maintain the productivity. Brazilian-Japanese could be the major labour force in the 
coming years to support the Japanese economy. The result of ageing problem is the demand of 
labour is greater than supply in the market nowadays. Although the Japanese government are 
looking for high skilled immigrants, most of them are from overseas and it is the quantity that 
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matters most. Thus, the high skilled labour might not be the major target for the government to 
sustain its growth. 
Since the general election in 2012, Shinzo Abe, in his second term as the Prime Minister, has been 
advocating a number of economic policies to boost the economy from long-term recession and 
people called it Abenomics. One of the major policies of Abenomics is a dramatic weakening 
Japanese Yen in order to make Japanese goods more competitive in global market. For example, 
in 2013, Toyota’s profits more than tripled to the last year thanks to the Abenomics. With more 
demand on local production, Canon and Panasonic declared more overseas factories would move 
back to Japan.98 
The nature of manufacturing industry and services sector are labour-oriented business, so the 
problem of shortage of labour is more serious in these businesses. Jobs in manufacturing industry 
require high standard of physical requirement and longer working hours which is not suitable for 
aged workers. Also, the increase of university graduates is another cause for shortage in the 
sector. In 2014, the percentage of enrollment to university increased to 53.9% from 32.8% in 1994. 
With higher education level, more young people prefer to be a white collar and work in a better 
environment instead of 3K jobs. Thus, the labour shortage in labour-oriented work could result in 
closures of factories and workshops. 
Comparing with the case of Germany, we could get some insights in bringing immigrants to their 
home country. Germany has a similar demographic problem like Japan, having one of the world’s 
                                            
98 Strydom, Martin. "Toyota Profits More Than Triple With Help Of 'Abenomics'". Telegraph.Co.Uk., 
2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/transport/10043754/Toyota-profits-more-
than-triple-with-help-of-Abenomics.html. 
65 
most serious ageing problems with one of the world’s lowest birthrates. Unlike Japan, Germany 
welcomes immigrants from Eastern Europe and even refugees from the Middle East in recent 
years to plug a growing workforce hole” We will profit from this, too, because we need immigration,” 
German Labour Minister Andrea Nahles said. “The people who come to us as refugees should be 
welcomed as neighbors and colleagues.” If not encouraging more immigrants to come, by 2060, 
every third German could be over 65 by 2060, leaving two workers to support each retiree.99 
Looking back at the situation in Japan, from the table below, we can see large part of Brazilian-
Japanese work for manufacturing industry (86%) and service sector (6.7%). And 93% Brazilian-
Japanese are between ages 15-64 which counts for the workforce.100 
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Industry/Sector 
Non-
Japanese 
from Latin 
America 
Ratio 
(%) 
Brazilian-
Japanese 
Ratio 
(%) 
Manufacturing 51,980 85.0 47,444 86.0 
Service 4,524 7.4 3,708 6.7 
Wholesale and retail trade 669 1.1 571 1.0 
Dining 271 0.4 205 0.4 
Education 189 0.3 80 0.1 
Others 3,539 5.8 3,185 5.8 
Total 61,172 100.0 55,193 100.0 
 
Employees primarily performing 
labour dispatch or contracting 
business 
38,542 63.0 35,469 64.3 
Table 6: Employment status of non-Japanese from Latin America 
 and Brazilian-Japanese in 2003101 
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Age Brazil Ratio Male Ratio Female Ratio 
Below 5 17,264 6.4 8,82 6.0 8,412 7.0 
5-14 23,610 8.8 12,035 8.2 11,575 9.6 
15-19 16,106 6.0 8,397 5.7 7,709 6.4 
20-64 209,702 78.2 117,214 79.6 92,488 76.4 
Over 65 1,650 0.6 824 0.6 826 0.7 
Total 268,332 100 147,322 54.9 121,010 45.1 
Table 7: Foreign residents statistics (as of ends 2002)102 
When compared the case between Germany and Japan, both are facing the ageing problem and 
shrinking population. Germany is a society which is willing to accept and welcome immigrants from 
poor countries to sustain their productivity. On the other hand, Japan is unwelcoming the influx of 
immigrants to preserve the uniqueness of Japanese culture. However, since the Brazilian-
Japanese shared a similar appearance and value with the local people, it could be easier for them 
to assimilate into the community. Besides, they are the largest group of nikkeijin and most of them 
are aged 15 to 64, so they could meet the great demand from manufacturing industry. To give a 
middle-way of recommendation, it is suggested that the Japanese government should open more 
opportunities to attract immigrants, especially nikkeijin like the Brazilian-Japanese to Japan. 
9.2.4. Social Problems by Brazilian-Japanese 
On one hand, the Japanese government does not offer full support on the influx of the Brazilian-
Japanese. On the other hand, they could not assimilate into the local society and it raises various 
social problems which worsen their locals’ impression. 
                                            
102 Ministry of Justice of Japan. 
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First, the lack of social security policies towards Brazilian-Japanese as well as poor living and 
working conditions leads to an increase of crime rate and low education attendance rate.103 Most 
of the Brazilian-Japanese are paid by hourly wage instead of monthly paid like other Japanese 
workers. Therefore they could not enjoy the same level of salaries and benefits. A survey reveals 
that most of the nikkeijin workers were working without medical insurance and unemployment 
insurance. Also, some of them come to Japan through agencies, which also eat up their earnings  
Because of unfair treatments and poor living environment, the number of criminal offences 
committed by Brazilians dramatically increased. The number of Crimes committed by Brazilian in 
2002 (4,967) is twenty-two times larger than that in 1992. Moreover, Brazilian-Japanese were 
accused of most juvenile crimes in Japan.104 
Most Brazilian-Japanese would bring their wives and children to Japan, thus, the number of school 
age children (5-14 years old) increase by three times in ten years. In 1993, the number of school-
age children was 7,244, it became 23,610 in 2002. However, it is surprising that the non-
attendance ratio of the Brazilian-Japanese is high, more than a quarter of them do not go to school, 
as compareid with the 99.9% of the locals.105 The reason for not going to school is that some 
young Brazilian-Japanese could not catch up with the study progress due to their poor Japanese 
language skill and it is so costly to attend the Brazilian-language schools in Japan.  
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Hence, the reason for influx of the Brazilian-Japanese is to boost the productivity in the long run 
instead of creating social problems in the community. It is recommended that the government 
should offer adequate support in terms of policies to the Brazilian-Japanese. 
9.3. Recommendations on immigration policy reform 
In 2015, the former Japanese Minister in charge of Women’s Empowerment, Haruko Arimura, 
suggested reforming the existing immigration policy with a view to promoting the country’s 
sustainability for the sake of future generations. In fact, she is married to a Malaysian and they 
bear two children. With her personal experience, she certainly knows what difficulties and 
mistreatment the immigrants and their families are encountering and how severe social tensions 
between immigrant and Japanese are.106 
Considering the Japanese social and cultural homogeneity, many scholars are relatively 
permissive towards Japanese migration in the foreseeable future. Yet, Paul Collier, Professor of 
Economics at Oxford University, has different views. While “rapid migration” might lead to social 
instability and mutual distrust among communities, “moderate migration”, i.e. accepting new 
immigrants gradually, is beneficial to the whole society in long run.107. 
To improve the prevailing immigration policy and promote a friendly atmosphere for welcoming 
Brazilian-Japanese, we believe that three barriers need to be removed, namely (1) the systemic 
barrier; (2) the sentimental barrier; and (3) language barrier. 
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9.3.1. Systemic barrier 
In our previous discussion, it is mentioned that the Brazilian-Japanese, as the descendants of 
Japanese emigrants, can obtain working visas more easily than other ethnic groups do. Yet, they 
do not enjoy any privilege of obtaining the Japanese citizenship. In fact, without the citizenship is 
troublesome in the country. For instance, they are not entitled to obtain any social benefits 
including public housing and social assistance for the unemployed. Up till today, the Brazilian-
Japanese still have to resort to seeking assistance from non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).108 
It is imaginable that such discriminatory policies towards new immigrants strongly discourage their 
integration, leading to social unrest. We therefore suggest the Japanese government reviewing the 
current immigration policies and providing more assistance to them. For example, a certain degree 
of social welfare can be offered to those who hold valid working visas but are not yet qualified to be 
a citizen at the moment. Besides, regards should be given to the undesirable working environment 
the Brazilian-Japanese frequently has. The Japanese government can take self-initiative to 
strengthen monitoring on companies hiring them. 
9.3.2. Sentimental barrier 
In locals’ eyes, the Brazilian-Japanese are low class people who come to Japan for exploiting 
resource and for the sake of making money. The prejudice against the Brazilian-Japanese would 
discourage their integration into local communities and lead to social isolation. It is therefore 
suggested that public education through social media and traditional media should be enhanced in 
                                            
108 De Carvalho, Daniela. Migrants And Identity In Japan And Brazil. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2003. 
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order for the public to better understand that the engagement of Brazilian-Japanese has been 
being conducive in boosting the economy. From the governmental level, the authority can 
implement new policies such as gathering opinion representatives and parties to facilitate 
communication and interaction between different ethnic groups, promoting inter-marriage between 
locals and Brazilian-Japanese, etc. In the domestic level, local and Brazilian-Japanese can jointly 
organise activities for the sake of social integration. For example, local communities in Tokyo has 
been regularly organising the carnival parade, which is the largest one outside Brazil, with a view 
to providing an opportunity of mutual understanding. 
On the other hand, Brazilian-Japanese should in turn show their willingness of integration into local 
communities. It is of utmost importance in such a socially exclusive society. There are reports that 
Brazilian-Japanese have difficulties in understanding the local cultures and practices. Both the 
Japanese and Brazilian governments are recommended to jointly offer pre-return migration 
education to the potential immigrants before they emigrate to Japan.  
9.3.3. Language barrier 
It is mentioned in Section 8.2.2 that language is one of the major obstacles to the Brazilian-
Japanese’ integration into the local community. To help them manage Japanese as a new 
language, provide training in an either mandatory or voluntary mode to working adults and school-
age children is an effective solution. 
In the Japanese business culture, they have very complex and intricate business etiquette and 
personal relationships and the proper use of language constitutes a major part of it. Since many 
Brazilian-Japanese are not familiar with it, companies can provide tailor-made courses with an 
emphasis on business language and gesture to immigrant employees. It is anticipated that 
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language training can help them better adapt to the complicated business culture and avoid 
making mistakes resulted from the language barrier. 
In the school level, more attention should be given to the language proficiency of Brazilian-
Japanese students. A study shows that these students encounter learning difficulties and 
adjustment problems when they study in local schools, some of them even refuse to receive 
mainstream education because of their illiteracy in Japanese. In this connection, the Japanese 
government should take a lead in assisting all non-Japanese speaking students, regardless of their 
ethnicity, in adapting to the local education system and integrating into the community as early as 
possible. Considering that language is of utmost importance in local communities, Japanese-
language learning should be made compulsory to them. 
10. Conclusion 
Consistent with various literature and surveys, our study reveals that most Brazilian-Japanese are 
eager to go home (i.e. Brazil) and the reason why they are strangled in Japan is mainly due to their 
fiscal incapability. They are unable to earn stable income if they do not do the 3K jobs due to 
discrimination from the local Japanese. In other words, economic concerns only serve as a 
secondary or passive factor, it is the role of identity the real determinant of their third migration. 
When the discrimination become persistent and institutionalised, they are structurally excluded 
from the mainstream society and undermine their sense of Japaneseness before they arrived. At 
the same time, their inner cultural identity of Brazilian is rediscovered and enhanced when they are 
or feel bing looked down by the locals, thus reinforcing their eagerness to return home. We argue 
that economic reasons provided by the push-pull factor model is not conclusive given that the 
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salaries they receive in Japan is still more favourable, and that the transformation of the Brazilian-
Japanese’ identity from being a Japanese to Brazilian should be a valid and empirically sound 
explanation. 
The study of identity is crucial since it is supposed to be the silver bullet to Japan’s serious ageing 
problem. With the number of elderlies mounting higher and higher, demographic challenge has 
always been the most worrying and contentious issue faced by Japan. In light of this ageing 
problem, we have proposed two solutions: increasing the birth rate and implementing immigrants-
friendly policies. Whilst the first option is hard to achieve in the short run, attracting international 
talents is also difficult owing to the uniqueness of Japanese mono-ethnicity and tradition of anti-
assimilation. The Brazilian-Japanese is the exception and the best option for Japan since they 
share the common ancestry, dating back to the Meiji era. Also, they have the comparative 
advantage that they look like Japanese locals and have more proximity in their value system.. 
Moreover, they are the largest group of foreign nationals in Japan which could provide an 
adequate supply of labour in the coming future. However, due to the lack support to the Brazilian-
Japanese and the institutionalised discrimination against them from the locals, they cannot 
assimilate into the society and became a social problem. Some of them also re-ignite their identity 
of Brazilians and chose to leave. As a result, Japanese and their government should learn from 
this lesson and try their best retain the Brazilian-Japanese. Thus, it is recommended that the 
companies should try to hire more Brazilian-Japanese and offer a level playing field for their 
competition with the local, the Japanese government should think of the solutions to help them in 
overcoming systemic, sentimental and language barriers and most importantly, the society in its 
entirety should accept people from different cultural background and institutionalise their openness 
in mind to create an accommodating society in the long run. 
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